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The problem 
 
In 2003, Bulgaria’s GDP finally clawed its way back to pre-1989 levels on 
the back of six back-to-back years of growth in roughly 4.5% annual 
increments. Consumer spending figures reveal a pick-up in the financial 
fortunes of most Bulgarians1. The statisticians reported a fall in 
unemployment from 19% in April 2000 to 13.5% in December 2003. 
Domestic consumer lending doubled year-on-year in 2003. Sofia is in the 
run-up to its EU accession. Following the logic of the dominant mantra of 
the supranational financial institutions, all these stable positive trends 
should translate into increasing public support for the policy of economic 
growth as well as for the majorities, governments and reformers that 
pursue it. Surprisingly, Bulgarians’ personal and collective outlook is 
becoming gloomier, voter disaffection is spreading and public support for 
the government’s economic agenda is waning. We have termed the wide 
discrepancy between the macro-economic dimensions of the transition and 
their subjective perception by society the “paradox of the Bulgarian 
transition.”  
 
GDP and optimism in Bulgaria, 1998-2003 
Source: GDP data from the National Statistical Institute; optimism 
survey by BBSS Gallup International, yearly data represents median 
monthly data: percentage of positive responses to the question “Is 
Bulgaria changing for the better?” 
                                                 
1 “Social stratification in Bulgaria” (1999-2004), Mediana Agency  
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Data collected by several polls reveals strong correlation between people’s 
expectations and voter turnout and between expectations for the future 
and confidence in the political institutions. Each post-1989 election in 
Bulgaria has been decided by the anti-incumbency votes, a trend 
attributable to the permanently high levels of public pessimism.  
 
 
  People with income in 
decline 
Unchanged 
income 
status 
People with income 
gains 
Vote at the 1990 general elections 
Bulgarian Socialist Party 42% 21% 13% 
Union of Democratic Forces 
(UDF) 
23% 39% 35% 
Movement for rights and 
freedoms 
4% 5% 3% 
Vote at the 2001 general elections 
NDSV 34% 32% 25% 
United Democratic Forces 13% 20% 25% 
BSP-led Coalition for 
Bulgaria  
23% 13% 9% 
Vote at the 2001 presidential elections 
Georgi Parvanov 51% 39% 29% 
Petar Stoyanov 27% 37% 42% 
 
As seen from the table above, the anti-incumbency sentiment, fuelled by 
the negative outlook of the voters, elects Bulgaria’s governments. In terms 
of politics, the Bulgarian society is in a place where economic growth has 
no knock-on effect on political support while in terms of economics, 
Bulgarians’ negative outlook chokes off investment and free enterprise. 
The markets have developed the ability to turn into reality the 
expectations of the entities involved in the commercial exchange. 
Therefore if we could answer the questions “Why the economic growth 
generates no optimism?” and “Who are the people that see no upside to the 
economic growth?”, we would be able to formulate a platform for the 
expansion of the social base of reformist policy which is the primary goal 
of our report. 
The ghost of comparisons 
The comparisons with other societies and economies further underscore 
the “paradox of the Bulgarian transition”. In the U.S., a blip in consumer 
confidence prefigures the onset of recession while bullish consumer 
sentiment promotes economic growth and the public profile of the 
government. In the EU and in Central and East European countries, 
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economic growth also underpins a positive outlook about the future. A 
comprehensive opinion survey conducted by Eurobarometer in October-
November 2003 found that Bulgarians are the biggest malcontents among 
the 13 EU membership hopefuls, including Turkey. Bulgarians also have 
the most pessimistic view of the future and the least confidence in their 
domestic institutions.  
 
Bulgaria sulks at the bottom of the Life Satisfaction table with only 31% of 
its citizens content wite the life they lead. All other membership aspirants 
have greater segments of upbeat population: 40% in Romania, 85% in 
Slovenia, 83% in Malta, 82% in Cyprus, 69% in Turkey, 54% in Hungary 
and Slovenia. The average of content citizens for the EU is 79% while that 
for the 13 aspirants is 60%. Bulgarians are also the most critical of the 
changes that have happened in the past 5 years – 13% think the situation 
in the country has improved while 50% hold the opposite view. In contrast, 
46% of Turkish respondents, who were in the midst of an economic crisis 
at the time of the poll, said they were better off than 5 years earlier. 
Bulgarians are second-to-last when it comes to the outlook for the next 
five years – only 35% expect things to get better, a reading that is closest 
to Slovenia where 33% share the same view. Confidence in the institutions 
– government, parliament, citizen organisations and parties, is another 
area where Bulgarians placed second-to-last. Only 14% have confidence in 
these institutions versus 56% of Cypriots, 44% of Maltese, 41% of Turks, 
38% of Estonians and 32% of Hungarians. Poles are most distrustful of 
their institutions with only 15% having confidence in them. 
Why are we this way? 
Many an analyst has tried to interpret and rationalise the disconnect 
between growth and optimism on the backdrop of large-scale or modest 
comparisons. A study of previous analyses and of interpretations that 
have appeared in the media has defined three types of assertions that 
explain the “Bulgarian angle”: economic, media and stemming from 
national psychology. 
 
The stripped-down version of the economic theory represents an income 
determinism that seeks and finds the roots of the pessimism exclusively in 
poverty and lowly incomes: “we are pessimists because we are poor.” 
 
The incumbents search for the source of pessimism in a “media 
conspiracy”. They blame the media for “distorting” reality and failing to 
give coverage to the progress that has been achieved: “the public is 
pessimistic because it is being manipulated by the media”. 
 
But everyone subscribes to the conclusions of popular psychology: “we are 
pessimists because we are Bulgarian.” 
 
The current report goes beyond the search of a catch-all explanation for 
the “pessimism of the transition” and focuses on identifying the factors 
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that determine the pessimistic mode of the different social groups. We are 
not so much attempting to explain neither the sources nor the 
proliferation of social pessimism but to understand the dynamics of 
pessimism and thus work out a vision of a reformist agenda that will win 
public support.  
The approach 
The current report analyses the findings of a series of studies performed 
by different teams of sociologists as well as data from a comprehensive 
survey conducted for the purposes of the report in December 2003 and 
from 17 anthropological field studies held in late 2003. The theories that 
took shape during the team discussions have been tested against a range 
of research methods in three distinct phases. The process begins with an 
analysis of existing sociological, anthropological, regional and macro-
economic studies, statistical data and economic and cultural chronicles 
with the goal of formulating working theories. Then these provisional 
theories are tested and fine-tuned in socio-anthropological studies 
conducted in 17 locations around the country - selected in terms of type of 
population centre, level and pace of development, and backed up with 200 
exhaustive interviews. Finally, the conclusions from the second phase and 
the correlations that jumped out of prior sociological surveys are used as 
the baseline for a national representative sociological study and for the 
formulation of the final results.  
Definitions and Hypotheses 
The word “optimism” is present in the dictionary of Naiden Gerov in its 
absence. In the history of sociological study in Bulgaria, the word will 
always be associated strongly with Ivan Hadjiiski and his “Optimistic 
theory about the Bulgarian people”.  
In the course of and for the purposes of the current paper, social optimism 
and pessimism are defined as the positive or, respectively, the negative 
expectations of the individual about his/her own future or the future of the 
community to which he/she belongs – family, population centre, region or 
state, as stated by the respondents in the poll’s answer sheet. 
This definition of optimism does not exhaust the much more complex 
essence of this phenomenon as a socio-psychological reality but it 
nevertheless allows us to draw comparisons with other studies and with 
other countries around the world.  
 
Several theories about the roots of social pessimism endemic to Bulgaria’s 
transition took shape during the search for an answer to the question 
“Why the economic growth generates no optimism?” The first theory traces 
the origin of this pessimistic streak to the pattern of historic development, 
to what Hadjiiski defines as “the unorthodox aspects of our societal 
development.”  The second theory centres on the impact of the models of 
socialist modernisation and the concepts formulated during the socialist 
era. The third theory examines the traits of the democratic system. The 
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fourth theory explores the distortions of post-communist publicity and the 
characteristics of the media environment. The fifth hypothesis breaks 
down the dynamics of social inequality and the regress of social status 
during the transition years while the sixth hypothesis looks at the 
egalitarian and integrating function of pessimistic speak.  
In the structure of the current report, the different hypotheses have lost 
their identity. Pessimism is viewed as fallout from the joint workings of a 
whole range of factors - that have varying degrees of gravity for each social 
segment and with varying degrees of impact at different times, and the 
upshot is determined by their interplay. It is impossible to isolate one or 
two factors on which to blame the causes for pessimism in Bulgaria. It is 
more useful to imagine a hierarchical aggregation of factors whose impact 
is enhanced or cushioned by various sets of circumstances.  
The analytical task is made that much more difficult by the fact that the 
study contains two layers and, therefore, two rows of data: a) synchronic 
data which tries to rate the factors conditioning social pessimism in terms 
of their significance; and b) diachronic data which tries to timeline the 
process. In general, the search for a comprehensive explanation of 
pessimism as a phenomenon, which integrates so many individual and 
supraindividual traits is beyond the scope and resources of our type of 
study. Hence the focus on showcasing the dynamics of pessimism, the 
factors that have the greatest impact on pessimism, the configuration of 
factors peculiar to the different social groups and the trends each group is 
facing.  
Status pessimism  
 
The hypothesis most frequently espoused by social theorists and most 
frequently encountered in the studied reality stipulates that pessimism is 
rooted in underpay while affluent groups are dominated by social 
optimism. Our study has confirmed the theory that low income leads to a 
negative outlook. Contrary to expectations, while the under classes are 
proverbially pessimistic, the high-income brackets are not always as 
upbeat as is expected from them. On the whole, the status/income 
correlation can explain the individual and collective pessimism of some 
54% of Bulgarians of legal age.  
 
In addition to lowly income, social 
pessimism is also influenced by 
other powerful stratifying factors. 
In terms of potency, they can be 
ranked as follows: 1) income; 2) 
position in the professional 
hierarchy; 3) education; 4) type of 
population centre; 5) age. 
The status theory about social 
pessimism is closely linked to the  
  
“The field anthropological studies 
highlight the corellation between the 
type of population center and the level 
and nature of the optimistic and 
pessimistic sentiment. But the 
typology is different. In  population 
centers with a positive economic profile 
and outlook even the people with lower 
income hold a more optimistic view. On 
the other hand, in population centers 
with a negative economic profile and 
outlook even the people with higher 
social status feel pessimistic.”  
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social stratification which did not remain rigid during the transition. 
The social ranks of the socialist era are disintegrating to make room for a 
new configuration with new mechanisms for social mobility gaining the 
upper hand. The change in environment and mechanisms multiply the 
options for some while reducing opportunity for others to the point of 
atomisation.  
 
The transition has drawn a line between the members of the society who 
have benefited from it and those who have missed out. The expected 
general trend is that positive economic changes in an environment of free 
enterprise, flexible labour market and unbridled competition would 
gradually energise economic activity and bring prosperity to a broader 
segment of the population who can generate public support for the reform 
agenda. To a great degree, this process underpins the near-term 
expectations that a positive change in macro-economic parameters and in 
employment and income figures would ennoble the socio-psychological 
climate and will promote consumer spending, economic activity and a 
boost in social optimism. 
The “entry levels” of social pessimism and optimism used in the current 
study can be quantified as follows: 
 
Level of individual optimism 
Improved 42% 
No change 33% 
Deteriorated 23% 
 
 
Level of social optimism (on national level) 
Improved 17% 
No change 37% 
Deteriorated 43% 
 
 
The following integral variable can then be deducted 
Optimistic in personal and in national terms 15% 
Optimistic in personal terms but pessimistic 
in national terms  
26% 
Pessimistic in personal and in national terms 54% 
 
The study makes it possible to outline definitively the limits of this 
paradigm  
 
Income per household member 
Less than 50 levs 15% 
50-100 levs 36% 
100-150 levs 21% 
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150-200 levs  13% 
200-300 levs  6% 
Over 300 levs 3% 
 
 
Structure of the population in 
terms of social status self-
assessment 
ІV.2002 ХІІ.2003 Change 
Low (1 to 4) 80% 62% -18 
Average (5) 13% 20% +7 
High (6 to 10) 7% 18% +11 
 
 
 
     
  Optimistic in 
personal and 
in national 
terms 
Optimistic in 
personal terms 
but pessimistic 
in national 
terms 
Pessimistic in 
personal and 
in national 
terms 
    Row % Row % Row %
Education Graduate 27,8% 35,0% 32,7%
  Undergraduate 17,1% 28,0% 51,2%
  High-school 15,5% 31,2% 49,0%
 Primary 7,6% 12,8% 72,4%
Less than 50 levs 5,3% 11,3% 78,2%
50-100 levs  9,5% 21,6% 62,4%
100-150 levs  20,0% 28,6% 45,9%
150-200 levs  20,4% 42,1% 35,3%
200-300 levs  28,7% 32,7% 37,6%
Над 300 levs  36,8% 42,1% 19,3%
  
Average monthly 
income per household 
member: 
  
 
 
Decline 10,9% 22,0% 61,5%
No change 20,7% 27,4% 45,5%
Difference in current 
vs. 1989 position  
Improvement 24,5% 38,4% 33,6%
Low (1 to 4) 7,2% 17,2% 70,0%
Average (5) 19,9% 37,9% 37,6%
Structure of the 
population in terms of 
social status self-
assessment High (6 to10) 31,9% 43,6% 20,2%
 
 
The data confirms the people with the highest income tend to exhibit the 
strongest upbteat sentiment; the trend is especially relevant for people 
with monthly income exceeding 300 levs per household member. The 
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people with a monthly income of less than 150 levs and those with 
monthly income in excess of 150 levs sit on the opposite sides of the fault 
line identified by the study. The great divide applies to the personal 
outlook as well as to the view on where the country is headed. The 150-lev-
monthly-income divide has emerged as the most relevant Bulgarian 
divide, a cut-off line more divisive than the state borders. The second point 
of differentiation is the position in the professional hierarchy; three highly 
distinct levels emerged here – top executive, mid-tier manager and staff. 
In terms of private versus public sector, people that are privately 
employed exhibited higher levels of optimism than their public sector 
counterparts. Third comes the educational background followed by the 
type of population centre and age; the better the education, the bigger the 
population centre and the younger the person, the more likely is he/she to 
feel greater social optimistic. 
The younger university-educated urbanites are the people that benefited 
from the reforms and they carry the highest charge of social optimism. 
Some 14-15% of the population exhibit high levels of individual social 
optimism. A peripheral segment of another 14% can also be classified here 
although they are affected by this trend to a lesser extent.  
This group has uninhibited consumer habits, borrows from the banks and 
has more savings opportunities; values education and has access to 
modern consumer goods; displays a positive outlook and a positive 
assessment of Bulgaria’s course of development. This is the only group 
where the positive view about the country’s development in the past 13 
years prevails over the negative view. 
Changes in status and optimism  
 
The comparison of current data with findings from prior periods has 
revealed several distinct changes in the trends affecting social pessimism 
and optimism. 
  
The table below illustrates the changes in the self-assessment of personal 
circumstances: 
  
Current assessment: 
 
 2002 2003  
Low /1 – 4/ 80% 62%  - 18 
Average /5/  13% 20%       + 7 
High /6-10/     7% 18%       +11 
 
Expectations for period after 5 years:  
 2002 2003  
Low /1 – 4/ 60% 38% - 22 
Average /5/ 12% 16%      + 4 
High /6-10/  15% 28%      +13 
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No expectations 13% 18%  
 
The expectations about forthcoming changes are more positive than the 
registered improvement in current assessments. The low assessment of 
current social status has deteriorated by 18% while the portion of 
respondents with low expectations has increased by 22%. The other, 
perhaps more relevant, factor is the significant change in the actual 
structure of the expectations about the personal financial status. 
 
While a year go the low assessments (60% - grades 1-4) clearly have the 
upper hand over the average- and high-assessment responses, the latest 
data reflects a shift towards a structure that is closer to that of societies 
with a middle class that is still taking shape: 38% low assessments, 16% 
average, 28% high and 18% with no response (people that usually 
gravitate towards the average level). If this trend persists, we could expect 
self-assessment responses to begin to be dominated by the “average” levels 
thus upending the current structure of the pyramid. Curiously, as many 
as 62% of respondents expected 18 months to be related to the bottom 
echalons of the social hierarchy within years but only 60% of informants 
placed themselves there in the latest poll. At the moment, 22% of 
respondents that said they are on the lower social rungs already perceive 
some upward mobility.  
The conclusion at this stage is that the positive dynamic affecting social 
mobility in the past year has generated no social optimism. 
 
The other indicated that should be examined here is the direction in which 
social status is changing in relation to the provisional starting point which 
is 1989. The comparison between the two studies reveals the following 
tendency: 
  
In comparison with 1989 
 2002 2003 
Decline 78% 66% 
No change 10% 16% 
Improvement 12% 18% 
 
In comparison with 5 years ago 
 2002 2003 
Decline 57% 50% 
No change 29% 33% 
Improvement 14% 17% 
 
A substantial portion of respondents perceive themselves as losing more 
ground on their position in 1989 than on their status of five years ago. At 
present, the portion of informants that have either maintained or 
improved their status from five years ago is levelling off with the sliders 
but it is the comparison with 1989 that determines the outlook for the 
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future. The comparison with 1989 is the frame of reference used by the 
people who have missed out on the reforms in assessing their social 
potential and the outlook for the society as a whole.  
Positive change in the self-assessment 
 
The first axis of adjustment is 
along the lines of self-
assessment of the personal 
social status. In comparison 
with May 2002, the portion of 
Bulgarians who perceive 
themselves at the low-end of 
the social ladder has fallen by 
a fifth. Of the people that left 
this segment, 7% joined the 
respondents that see 
themselves mid-ladder while 
11% said they have jumped 
straight to the top of the pile. 
  
In comparison with 2002, the 
number of people with upward 
momentum has risen by 18%. 
It is also equally significant 
that the positive projections 
stretch to the near-term. A 
year ago, the expectations 
about the future were also  
more positive than the assessment of the current social status. The 
comparison between the expectations recorded in 2002 and the view of 
personal circumstances circa 2003 shows that the two structures are very 
similar and that the difference consists in an outlook more positive than 
the initial projects. 
           
 
 Expectations
: 
Actual status: 
 2002 2003 
Low /1 – 4/ 60% 62% 
Average /5/ 12% 20% 
High /6-10/  15% 18% 
 
The persistent social pessimism is largely due to the fact that the 
“reference social status”, the reconstruction of the pre-1989 social status 
continues to be a target well beyond the assessment not only of the current 
Elemental nature of the improvements 
Bulgaria is on the right track and things are 
gradually getting better (Varna, Bourgas, 
Tetevan, ect).  Some respondents choose to 
focus on the right direction while others are 
bugged by the sluggish pace of progress. It 
should be noted that a very popular and very 
negative question is no longer asked: “when 
are we going to bottom out,” “when is thid 
light at the end of the tunnel coming,” etc. I 
would term this leitmotif elemental, natural 
or cyclical optimism because progress is not 
perceived as the result of the conscious 
actions of a particular subject. On the 
contrary, once things like macroeconomics, 
nominal growth, etc, come up, the 
respondents tune out and, effectively, 
dismiss the claims of the incumbents that 
they have accomplished something positive 
or useful. When the emphasis is on the right 
direction of movement, the opinions are 
worded as observations. When the slow rate 
of improvement is in focus, the cosmic 
optimism is just one in a range of rhetoric 
ploys used to strip the elite of its legitimacy. 
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but also of the social status in the foreseeable future. It should be noted 
that the hyperinflation of 1997 is no longer a reference point for social 
status comparisons. 1997 is no longer embedded in the collective 
unconscious as the push-off point. 1989, or the remembrance of 1989, is 
the only point of reference for the formulation of public expectations. 
Curiously, this applies in equal measure even to the younger generations 
for whom 1989 must be nothing more than a blur. 
 
Two trends have been identified in 
this respect. On the one hand, most 
of Bulgarians still feel like social 
back-sliders. The majority (57%) 
place themselves on the upper five 
rungs in 1989 while 22% say they 
were on the lower four. Now the 
ratio has been reversed: the 
majority (62%) see themselves on 
the lower four while 20% say they 
are perched on the top five steps of 
the social ladder. This reversal in 
the social status assessment is a 
valid cause for social pessimism. 
Respondents that have a positive 
view of their pre-1989 status and a 
negative view of their current 
position are that much more likely 
to have a negative outlook about 
the future. There is a very strong 
correlation between a downward 
movement on the social ladder and 
social pessimism. Curiously, the 
opposite is not true.  
The correlation between the upward movement on the social ladder and 
the level of social optimism is rather weak. 
The perceptions about upward and downward social mobility influence the 
level of social optimism or pessimism but do so in different ways. A slip 
down to the bottom of the social ladder and the downward movement as a 
whole are observed to stoke social pessimism. But not necessarily vice 
versa. Neither the upward mobility nor the ascent to the upper reaches of 
the social ladder automatically improve social optimism readings.  
 
Therefore it is imperative to determine which social groups were the 
engines of the positive individual social betterment registered by the 2002 
and 2003 polls. A comparison study identified positive trends in all social 
groups with the exception of the oldest segment of the population, of 
people with primary education and of people with a monthly income per 
household member of less than 50 levs. In their case, sentiment worsened 
by 2-2.5% which is within the margin of statistical error. All other 
Phantom improvements. 
 
The second basic leitmotif, which 
applies to changes on regional and 
national level and to changes of macro-
economic indicators or the urban 
environment, concerns the so called 
“cosmetic changes.” This phrase is used 
to describe not only cabinet reshuffles 
and the work of mayors in the run-up 
to elections but as a catch-all term for 
everything happening in the country. 
It is frequently used to denote changes 
in the economic, political or urban 
environment perceived as 
insubstantial, immaterial, insifficient, 
minimalist or even bogus. Apparently, 
these developments are judged against 
an ideal for change that dwarfs all 
current goings-on. In most cases, the 
scale of the comparison is borrowed 
from the breadth of the socialist-era 
industrialisation with its juggernaut 
plants and plethora of jobs. 
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surveyed groups exhibited a change in the positive direction. The problem 
is that the groups characterised by at least one of those traits represent 
46.9% of the overall population. The presence of even one of the three 
factors (age, education or income) immediately spikes the level of social 
pessimism to 70% - versus a national average of 54%, and increases the 
portion of respondents who say they occupy the nether reaches of the 
social ladder to 80%, versus an average of 62% for the overall population.  
 
If we focus on the group of respondents who are younger than 60 and have 
only elementary education (a community that represents 17% of the 
overall population), we will see that it accounts for 41% of people in the 
lowest income bracket (less than 50 levs a month) and for 40% of people 
with monthly income per household member of less than 100 levs. As 
many as 50% of the members of this group live in rural areas while the 
ethnic breakdown reads as follows: 58% Bulgarians, 23% ethnic Bulgarian 
Turks, 17% Roma. 
  
If we now isolate the group which sees no year-on-year change in its status 
(it represents 46% of overall respondents and breaks down as follows: 24% 
of the group is older than 61, 30% has elementary education and 16% has 
income of less than 50 levs; 80% of this particular group of informants say 
have been on the way down since 1989), it is important to determine 
which are the social groups that drove the positive movement on the social 
ladder.  
General trends in social stratification 
The general trends in social stratification remain stable with Sofianites, 
young people and people with higher education and good income 
perceiving themselves to be in a better position. At the same time, the 
intensity of changes detected in these factors is relative.  There is a strong 
correlation between educational background and income power; the 
correlation between the position on the professional ladder and income is 
even stronger; the correlation between the position in the professional 
hierarchy and the educational background is somewhat weaker.  
 
Distance between the highest and the lowest positions on the different 
factors in 2002 and in 2003. 
 
 
 2002 2003 
Place of 
residence:  
2.5:1 3.5:1 
Age 2.5:1 5:1 
Education 4:1 8:1 
Income 30:1 32:1 
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Change in the social status self-
assessment among the different age
groups:
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Change in the social status self-
assessment depedning on the
educational background:
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Change in the social status self-assessment in terms of
income level
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Educational background, income, age and place of residence are power 
factors of social differentiation with the biggest change being registered in 
the movement towards the better positions. That explains while no major 
change in average-level readings was recorded and the respondents 
realigned directly to the top positions. The uptick in individual social 
optimism is attributable to the jump in positive sentiment exhibited by the 
groups in leading positions, the moderate gain recorded in the mid-tier 
groups and the lack of any changes in the mood of the low-income 
respondents. The people that benefited from the reforms have continued to 
reap the perks of ongoing social changes. This corroborates the theory that 
it would take a lengthy period of stable development for positive changes 
to occur in the respondents’ personal life. Individual optimism is the result 
of raising income and an upward social mobility spanning a period longer 
than one or two years.  
Pessimism in the public sphere 
If the theory based on the status/income correlation explains 
comprehensively the views of 54% of Bulgarians, it falls short of 
rationalising the behaviour, expectations and the sentiment of the 
remaining 46%. Their behaviour is most often and most easily explained 
with the nature of the media environment.  
The media as a source of pessimism 
The study has determined that the media are one of the mechanisms for 
the proliferation of social pessimism but they are not seen as the cause for 
its massive profusion. The influence wielded by the media is greatly 
exaggerated. The negative messages communicated by the media have the 
biggest impact on the section of the society whose pessimism is 
preconditioned by its status and income circumstances. In this sense, the 
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catastrophic image of current reality depicted by the media is more the 
result of “ambulance chasing” rather than fallout from the ideological 
strategy of the media themselves.  
 
The Eurobarometer findings 
cited at the beginning of the 
report show that Bulgaria is the 
EU aspirant with the smallest 
portion of newspaper readers: 
only 15% of Bulgarians read 
newspapers on daily basis 
versus 43% of Hungarians, 32% 
of Estonians, 28% of Slovenians 
and 17% of Romanians. But the 
clout of the media is not a 
function of people’s perception of 
it. So there would be no point in 
taking these data as the only 
valid point of reference. The 
forte of the media is in 
providing the general moulds, 
the ready formulae for the 
interpretation of reality that 
package the different individual  
sets of experiences and set the 
general tone for emotional 
sensitivity.  
 
 
The data collected by our study shows that the pessimism of only one third 
of Bulgarians can be traced to the media.  
 
It should be noted that the TV channels are the highest penetration 
among the media, followed by the newspapers, which reach 20-25% of the 
population. But the influence of the newspapers is heightened by the 
snowball effect, i.e. the extensive chatter, recounting and rumours 
generated by the news on a scale far greater than the initial scope of the 
respective media. The comparison between the anxiety readings for the 
different social groups shows that they are highest for the people that are 
the most infrequent readers or viewers (these are most often older people 
with lower social status and income and poor education). This group is 
most susceptible to the influence of the different media. These people 
usually have a sketchy knowledge of the origin of a particular problem and 
of its causes and implications but are nevertheless greatly influenced by 
the anxiety of the message, which taps into their social predisposition 
towards a feeling of insecurity and no future. In terms of social profile, 
these are people with no resources to deal with problems on their own. But 
the media explanation of the pessimistic streak is restrictive when we 
The fact that the wide-spread cynicism 
rules the press but is less present on TV is 
especially noteworthy. People watch news 
broadcasts, films and entertainment 
shows. It was found that respondents with 
higher education watch news bulletins 
more often but trust what they hear less 
than the people with high-school education 
who say they watch primarily films and 
entertainment shows. Respondents often 
talk about bad news and the fact that the 
bTV news bulletins sound like police logs. 
Curiously, few  respondents.confirm that 
they take media information seriously and 
claim they usually “tune out.” Some of the 
respondents –police officers and students, 
say they believe only the foreign media 
outlets like BBC, Euronews and CNN. It 
would be difficult to group the respondents 
in terms of their views on this topic 
because the responses were varied. One or 
two of the respondents mention that they 
have taken some media information into 
account when making personal decisions 
but that does not emerge as a popular 
approach. 
Association Global Bulgaria Initiative, 2003 - 2004 
 
 16
have to explain why the people with improving income and social mobility 
still cling to their negative outlook. 
 
Democracy as a source of pessimism 
 
Is it possible that the very nature of democratic society with its inherent 
arguments, conflicts, discussions, debates, public battles, criticisms, 
highlighting of risks, drawing up of risk scenarios in connection with one 
decision or another, is the cause of a shortage of social optimism in the 
transition period? 
Compared to the other EU 
applicant countries, a mere 
22% of Bulgarians are 
satisfied with the quality of 
democracy at home, as against 
73% on the still divided island 
of Cyprus, 60% in Malta, 50% 
in Slovenia, 41% in the Czech 
Republic and so on. Confidence 
in democracy is lowest among 
Slovaks at 17% and 
Romanians at 21%. 
 
Our survey shows that the 
social pessimism of one in four 
respondents is strengthened 
by the very mechanism of 
decision-making in democratic 
society, namely arguments 
and discussions. These people 
tend much more to support 
decisions imposed from above  
and are receptive to messages such as “elections, referendums, 
parliaments, MPs… are just a waste of money”. 
The idea that lack of pluralism and citizens’ control may lead to total 
abuse of power is alien to them. This outlook includes the perception of 
democracy as “anarchy”, “abuse of freedom”. 
 
The survey registers a group of about 25% to 30% of people who are 
directly and unambiguously influenced by the media environment and 
identify the problems of the functioning of democracy with its principles. 
As has already been said, about 80% of this group consists of people of 
lower social status, elderly people, somewhat detached from active public 
life. There is, however, a group of some 15% to 20% of people holding 
rather senior positions, with high incomes, who, as a rule, are not 
sympathisers of the major political forces, and whose negativism results 
less from the general stereotypes and ideas imposed in the public sphere 
than from direct encounters with top management practices. Some of 
Deideologisation and anti-politicism 
 
One of the main characteristics of field 
surveys is that respondents are reluctant 
to talk politics, they make generalisations 
along the lines “everybody thinks about 
themselves”; weak, deceptive governance; 
seekers of undue benefits at the top. 
Unlike previous governments, however, 
this one does not pose a threat, does not 
exude power, and does not stop those who 
selfishly seek undue benefits in everyday 
life. The businessmen surveyed often claim 
that now one can solve any problem by 
giving money to the right person. This also 
applies to people who have made a fortune 
under the UDF and the BSP. Business has 
shed its subordinate position to power and 
negotiates with it on business-to-business 
terms. There is anger at people in 
government only in depressed regions, 
mostly among pensioners.  
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these people are probably part of this mechanism. They are pessimistic 
about the development of society because they know how they themselves 
rose in this society. Or, to paraphrase Groucho Marx, “I cannot be 
optimistic about a society in which I am one of the winners”. 
 
It should be noted that we live in a society in which the vast majority of 
people do not know what is good about democracy and have forgotten what 
is bad about socialism. The answers to an open-ended question about the 
advantages of socialism and democracy show that the characteristics of 
socialism are much more distinct in mass consciousness than those of 
democracy. 27% single out the lack of unemployment as the main 
advantage of socialism, 13% opt for safety, 6% mention peace and good 
living, and 6% say free education and healthcare. The disadvantages are rather less 
outstanding: 
 
Bans, restrictions – 4% 
Lack of personal freedom – 4% 
Lack of information – 2% 
Other - about or less than 1% 
 
As to the image of democracy, the largest proportion of respondents, 18%, 
say its main advantage is freedom, followed by free speech 8%, and 
freedom of movement across borders 4%. Private business and personal 
enterprise are mentioned by 1.8% and 1.3%, respectively, that is, as we 
said above, they have not taken hold as its solid healthy principles, they 
are not identified as effective engines of steady upward economic 
development. On the contrary, the “dark side” is much more distinct and is 
mainly associated with: 
 
Unemployment – 20% 
Crime and insecurity – 15% 
Poverty – 12% 
Corruption – 3% 
Anarchy – 3%, etc. 
 
It should be noted that there is a much more pronounced accretion of 
several main positive traits around the image of socialism and of several 
negative ones around that of democracy. Further, the positive image of 
socialism is linked with the individual’s social and economic status, 
including employment and security; on the contrary, the present model is 
perceived as a loss of this status, marked by unemployment, poverty and 
insecurity.  
The predominant view in society is that even if the model of current 
economic development can guarantee individual successes, it cannot 
guarantee broader opportunities to a larger portion of society. Bulgaria 
suffers from the lack of a collective project. 
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Self-assessment of social status in the following years: 
 1989 2003 
Below average (step 1 to 4) 10% 57% 
Average (5) 19% 20% 
Above average (step 6 to 10) 57% 18% 
No answer 14%   5% 
 
 
Reconstruction of the social trajectory depending on the self-
assessment of one’s place in society in 1989 and 2003 
Drop 66% 
Unchanged 15% 
Rise 19% 
 
Total consensuses and functional pessimism of the imagined 
majorities 
 
Neither the status nor the media interpretation of the issue raised can 
encompass the entire range of causes and sources of pessimism at a time 
of stable economic growth. Even the individuals who sense an 
improvement in their living standards and expect the environment to 
improve are not inclined to formulate a positive vision of the country’s 
development. Many of our contemporaries have a consumerist or 
optimistic investor behaviour: they set themselves aims, make plans, save 
money, take out loans, buy homes, used cars, mobile phones, cookers, 
washing machines, fridges, microwave ovens, computers, television sets, 
etc, and at the same time publicly reproduce pessimistic assessments of 
the present and the future. 
Mediana surveys confirm one of the main conclusions of the report on “The 
State of Society in 2002”: it is not just sharp social stratification we are 
witnessing, but the socialist-era vertical networks are being replaced by 
horizontal networks, in which communication exists only among social 
equals. The majority of poor people in Bulgaria do not know a single rich 
person, and they see anyone with an income exceeding 1,000 levs as rich. 
The emergence of horizontal networks answers the question why those 
who lost from the change cannot see the positive changes in social life. But 
why are reform beneficiaries “blind” to change, too? 
 
Social optimism cannot be reduced to, and deduced from, personal status 
characteristics alone. There are also more general collective prerequisites, 
of which the individual may not be aware, yet they determine his overall 
outlook and behaviour. This is so because individual optimism is unable to 
overcome the general negative vision of the country’s condition and governance. 
Moreover, it is not directly linked with a rise in confidence in the 
institutions or with a positive attitude to the policies pursued. Insofar as it 
exists, social optimism is a product of self-actuated economic mechanisms, 
Association Global Bulgaria Initiative, 2003 - 2004 
 
 19
which expand the individual’s options. In this sense, the survey strikingly 
shows that the social differentiation registered does not lead to different 
views on the problems facing society or their causes.  
 
There is practically a consensus 
in Bulgarian society on the sense 
of an economic slowdown and the 
idea of all-pervading self-
reproducing poverty. 86% of 
respondents in our survey single 
out poverty as Bulgaria’s worst 
problem, and 84% express the 
even more extreme view that 
“many people in Bulgaria have to 
scavenge for food in litterbins”. 
These are the two highest levels 
of unanimity registered in the  
entire survey, without any statistical correlation between their supporters 
and their social, educational and income status. The total sense of poverty 
is less characteristic of poor societies than of impoverished societies. 
 
Another point of consensus is the inability of the political forces and the 
state bodies to cope with this slowdown, as well as with the main problems 
facing the country in general. Between 65% and 78% have no confidence 
whatsoever in parliament, the government, the court and the political 
parties. These percentages have stayed almost the same in recent years. 
The exceptions are the president, the banking system and the media 
(above all television). Here again, there is no considerable difference in the 
assessments by the individual social groups. There are certain differences 
in their views on the causes of their inadequacy: mostly “personal” in the 
lower status groups and “linked with the functioning and control 
mechanisms” in the higher status groups. The result is the same, however: 
an all-pervading social conviction that the state bodies and the political 
forces as they are now cannot generate economic progress and justice in 
social relations. 
 
A comparison with the past, on the one hand, and with the present 
lifestyle of other countries, on the other hand, finds a paradoxical 
expression: a conviction that one cannot succeed in Bulgaria on the 
strength of one’s personal qualities. 80% of respondents say that one 
cannot prosper in Bulgaria without “connections”.  This, even if it does not 
render utterly meaningless, strongly erodes the meaning of all personal 
effort, economic activity, professionalism and personal decency. The lower 
an individual’s confidence in his ability to direct and control his own life 
through personal efforts, the stronger his pessimism. This is one of the 
most powerful correlations observed in the survey. 
All theses analysed above are characterised by the following: First, they 
are shared by the absolute majority of people, irrespective of their specific 
 
…When you ask them to describe the 
man in the street, no great nuances are 
registered; everybody says: “I’m an 
average person, those who scavenge 
through garbage are badly off, and 
since I cope with life, I’m an average 
Bulgarian.” I talked with a young 
mother in the park, who said many 
people scavenged in litterbins for food. 
I told her I had not seen anyone doing 
this, she looked around to see someone 
of that description and though she 
didn’t, she didn’t believe me…(Pleven) 
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social and economic situation, i.e. these are generally valid stereotypes, 
which play the role of a mass makeshift explanation of the social world. 
Second, they are shared with a very high degree of unanimity, irrespective 
of the specific practical experience of the individual social groups. Third, 
they lend sufficient stability to the social world they describe, which 
further strengthens their validity. They make the thesis of existence in 
poverty publicly legitimate (that is why it does not really matter that the 
economic indicators have moved up a few notches when Bulgaria still has 
the lowest GDP, is the poorest European country, meets with the worst 
reception, etc). The cause for this situation of the country is identified as a 
weakness and inadequacy of the institutions and politicians, the result 
being social injustice, which de-legitimises the very idea of success. This is 
going round in circles: the impossibility to achieve success by fair means 
makes poverty self-evident and self-understandable, and the two put 
together can breed nothing but… pessimism. 
  
The imaginary majorities 
 
We have come across an extremely interesting phenomenon in an attempt 
to determine the levels and the causes of the discrepancy between growth 
and optimism. 42% of respondents say they manage to cope with all 
difficulties and problems, but a mere 17% say this is true of people around 
them. 23% of Bulgarians aged 18 or over believe their life is going from 
bad to worse (their plight is deteriorating), but 43% are convinced that 
this is happening to a growing number of people. Thus from a personal 
perspective, the distinction between optimism and pessimism is drawn not 
only along the line of objective socio-demographic indicators, but also of 
the subjective perception of the relation between one’s own and the others’ 
prosperity.  
 
The logical question is: if 44% of people 
are convinced that they cope with life, 
there should be a majority of people 
who cope, while the general 
impression is quite the opposite – a 
mere 17% of people manage to cope. 
This apparently obvious paradox could 
be explained relatively most precisely 
using the concept of “imagined 
majority”, i.e. forming an imaginary 
idea of the opinion, position, behaviour 
and values of the majority of people. 
This very perception then begins to 
leave a mark on the individual’s 
outlook. 
Pessimistic talk turns into a socially 
prestigious position, being a way for 
those who benefited from the changes  
From “who stole the money” 
through “there’s no money” to 
“people have no money”. 
New notes come up in discussions 
of the general affairs of villages, 
small towns and neighbourhoods 
in recent years. They do next to 
nothing as usual but the 
explanations are different now. 
During my tour in November and 
December I kept hearing “there’s 
nothing we can do because people 
have no money”. Some want 
parents to raise money to paint 
the school, others want the 
neighbours to repair their street, 
still others suggest that the 
village should open a bakery 
turning out cheaper bread – and 
all these plans run into a general 
lack of money. Some years ago 
this would have triggered off talk 
about the money stolen from the 
state, and now they say people 
have no money. 
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to reintegrate into a society which considers itself a loser as a result  
of those changes. This self-induced logic of public consciousness is 
supported by other survey indicators as well. 
This, for instance, people aged between 45 and 50 are convinced that the 
situation in the country, the region or their population center is 
deteriorating. Pessimism is most pronounced about “the country”, and the 
views that have the widest currency are most easily reproduced about it. 
People are most critical of the institutions they know least. 
Also, total consensuses and imagined majorities become the main 
suppresser of individual optimism because it does not translate into a 
positive expectation for the development of the country as a whole. Those 
who have benefited from the changes have “waived” public representation 
of their experience.  
Collective memory as a generator of pessimism 
The theses of the status-related nature of pessimism and of the public 
sphere as a barrier to optimism are of limited theoretical and explanatory 
value. This is due to the fact that life in the present and expectations for 
the future presuppose past individual and collective experience, which to 
some extent sets the horizon of this life and these expectations. 
 
In this sense it can be assumed – and 
the survey proves – that the 
Bulgarians’ social pessimism is largely 
rooted in the “catch-up” model of 
modernisation characteristic of 
Bulgaria. An enduring sense of 
frustration arises from the 
considerable difference between 
economic conditions in Bulgaria and 
the developed countries. As a result, 
society focuses its attention on the 
country’s lagging behind ”the 
developed countries” rather than on 
the relative improvement from earlier, 
more unfavourable economic periods. 
Contrasted with those countries, the 
Bulgarian nation views itself as a 
systematic loser, to which those 
countries are hostile on top.   In socio-
psychological terms, the 
anthropological part of the survey 
established an interesting correlation: 
comparisons with 1989 are a source of 
pessimism for those who lost from the  
changes, low-income and downwardly mobile groups, while comparisons with Europe 
are a source of pessimism for the reform beneficiaries, upwardly mobile social 
groups.   
Anthropological field studies 
show that “abroad” is no longer 
an imaginary concept. The 
opening of the borders and the 
elimination of visas have led to 
an outflow of people abroad, 
which, according to respondents, 
is slowing down. Bulgarian 
groups abroad, the possibility to 
find a temporary or a permanent 
job abroad through them, either 
legally or illegally, is a standing 
source of individual optimism for 
people aged under 45 or 50. For 
some regions or population 
centres it is Greece, for others 
Spain, Italy, Germany, or the US. 
A recurrent topic is the existence 
of communities – population 
centres or neighbourhoods – of 
people from the same area, such 
as Pleven residents near Madrid, 
people from Doupnitsa near 
Milan, ethnic Turks and 
Bulgarian Muslims in Germany, 
etc. 
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Historically, periods of great upswings in the Bulgarian economy are rare 
and short as a rule; as a result, there is no collective memory of economic 
success and particularly of models of legitimate personal success, of a 
healthy economic environment where economic agents, not the state, play 
the leading role.  
 
Bulgaria’s predominant catch-up model of modernisation and the 
unchanging gap between economic conditions in Bulgaria and the 
developed countries create lasting prerequisites for the idea of the 
country’s permanent backwardness to dominate public consciousness, 
which forms a solid basis for reproduction of social pessimism. This social 
atmosphere creates the ideal breeding ground for extreme fatalistic 
theses, which form a self-sufficient circle of apparentcies  – explanations 
for the lack of economic progress and at the same time for the shortage of 
individual economic activity. 
 
Post-socialist pessimism 
Given the absence of a long enough period of economic and social upsurge 
in a free-market economy and under democratic political governance, the 
socialist model of “industrialised” upturn serves as a model of positive 
upward economic development. Apart from socialist industrialisation, 
there is no other model of upward development in the social memory of 
contemporary Bulgarian society. 
 
Consciously, or more often 
unconsciously, the idea of what 
successful economic development 
would be like is set against the rigid 
(and idealised) parameters of 
socialism: plants, industry, jobs for all, 
peace and safety. Since current 
development does not live up to this 
vision (and no other vision is offered), 
it is assessed not only as negative but 
as prospect less as well. 
The mass public concept of successful 
development centres round two top 
priorities, characteristic of the 
predominant vision of socialist 
industrialisation: 
- Industrial development and plant 
construction (61%); 
- Attracting investment (62%). 
 
It is true that the percentage of 
respondents setting a priority on 
Bulgaria is in absolute and total 
collapse; only one man expects 
that the country will slowly 
recover; their town used to be a 
prosperous industrial centre, 
which is now in decline; coal 
mines, steel, mechanical 
engineering; the plant in 
Chervena Mogila soaked up 
many workers. Now only young 
people do not mention this at all. 
People aged over 40 believe the 
closure of industries in Pernik 
spelled the end of the region 
because there are no proper 
conditions to develop agriculture 
and because they cannot imagine 
any other means of survival for 
people who have worked all their 
life in the pit or the plants. 
Young people do not care that 
much: what matters more to 
them is that there are more cafes 
and shops now. (Pernik) 
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“plants and industry” and on 
investment is practically the same, 
but in many cases the latter is 
thought of   
as investment in major industrial 
enterprises. Services, tourism, high 
technology, education and science 
are ranked lower (25% to 49% of 
respondents).  
 
To understand to what extent and 
how this socialist industrial model 
of progress is instrumental in 
generating social pessimism, it is 
essential to analyse the social 
groups expressing it. As has 
already been said, although the 
social groups differ in their 
assessments, the difference again is 
not statistically significant. We will 
present the distribution of the top 
three ranked priorities by some 
major social characteristics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How can development, progress and prosperity be achieved in the country? 
 By attracting 
investment 
Industry and 
plants 
Services 
and 
tourism 
Sofia 84% 40% 51% 
Regional capital 70% 71% 61% 
Small town 53% 64% 41% 
Village 51% 58% 37% 
    
18-30 67% 51% 51% 
31-40 70% 60% 55% 
On the whole, Vidin is considered a 
town in decline, which does not stand 
much chance of quick recovery. 
Respondents see the restart of the 
chemical plant as a way to revive the 
town. Before its closure, the plant had 
a workforce of 4,000 to 5,000; now 
when it is privately owned, it has some 
500 workers. Almost every Vidin 
resident is personally linked with the 
chemical plant because either he or she 
or at least one family member worked 
there. Some respondents, who run a 
private business, are involved in 
politics or have an administrative job, 
do not believe that the plant will ever 
work as it did before. They realise it is 
uncompetitive and there is no reason 
why it should operate at the same 
capacity as before. In Vidin, the 
chemical plant is a topic which crops 
up every time people talk about the 
town’s rise and fall. Only one 
respondent said the plant was to blame 
for the region’s poor condition: “We 
used to have a chemical plant here, 
which was no good, it made no profit at 
all. They used to send buses round the 
villages to take young women to work 
at the plant, they would give them a 
flat after a couple of years’ work, and 
now they need people to cultivate the 
land, but there is no one there. People 
saw it was better to live in the town. 
Villages were denuded of people, and 
the plant in the town was closed and 
plundered.” (Vidin) 
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41-60 64% 63% 51% 
Over 61 49% 69% 39% 
    
Student 68% 51% 52% 
Decision maker, public sector  78% 53% 64% 
Decision maker, private sector 72% 52% 54% 
Non-decision maker, public sector 64% 59% 53% 
Non-decision maker, private 
sector 
74% 63% 56% 
Unemployed 57% 61% 43% 
Pensioner 47% 69% 37% 
Total 62% 61% 49% 
 
The table shows clearly that industry and investment are vying for the top 
position in almost all social groups. Even in Sofia, whose population has 
the relatively most modern mindset and has outgrown to the largest 
extent the imposed socialist stereotype of economic development, the 
percentage of respondents who opt for it is not below 40%. It is no less 
significant that this view is shared by 51% of the youngest respondents 
and by 52-53% of people in senior positions. Given that some of those who 
opted for “investment” probably see it in the form of new factory chimney 
stacks, it is clear that the socialist stereotype of progress still is extremely 
viable and hugely influential in society. 
 
The differences between the 
social groups are symptomatic 
of the direction of future 
changes. However, the fact 
that 12 years after the start of 
transition the socialist model 
still is a yardstick of economic 
development shows that no 
other effective model of 
economic development has 
caught on. 
 
The basic attitude in Bulgaria 
is that it has neither a 
successful model of economic 
development nor effective 
institutions. That is why living 
standards are low and people 
cannot succeed by honest 
means; the only effective 
model which holds sway of  
social memory is that of  
GORUBSO, the company which used to be the 
backbone of the town until 1990, is operating at 
minimum capacity. There were dramatic workforce 
cuts, to be followed by more job losses, wages are 
too low and are paid several months in arrears. No 
money is allocated for work safety. Workers cannot 
feel safe because the materials they need are not 
provided. It is dangerous for miners to go down the 
mine. No one guarantees their safety. The 
equipment has been outdated for many years but no 
investment has been made to replace it and make 
working in the ore mines safer. No money is 
invested in the opening up of new ore mines, and 
some, which can still be used, are being closed. 
Mines whose resources have not been exhausted 
are closed down to save electricity. Only two ore 
mines are operating now. An informant said 
GORUBSO shed 100 jobs every month and 
intended to wind up by the year’s end, though a 
large proportion of the town’s population works 
there. Some say the town survives largely thanks 
to pensioners: most young people are 
unemployed and pensioners draw above-
average pensions. (Madan) 
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socialism (linked with industrialisation, as well as with benefits such as 
free health care, job security, a peaceful life, safety, etc), which is rejected 
by the entire ideology and practice of transition. The fact that today’s 
economic growth was achieved in the conditions of de-industrialisation 
makes it seem illegitimate, phoney, to society. 
 
The sociological map of pessimism 
 
The sources of negative expectations for the future amid stable economic 
growth outlined above, namely low status, the media environment, the 
nature of democracy, the imagined majorities, the characteristics of 
collective memory, including socialist-era examples which are unrealistic 
in principle, lead us to look back at the main groups and their 
characteristics. So far in the survey we have found and distinguished 
among three main and one intermediate group, which can be presented in 
terms of the following four types:  
 
Absolute pessimists – unfavourable expectations both for themselves and 
for the country as a whole; untypical pessimists – with a comparatively 
higher income and social status but with unfavourable expectations both 
for themselves and for the country as a whole; optimists – favourable 
expectations for themselves and for the country as a whole; people 
optimistic about themselves and pessimistic about the country – 
favourable expectations for themselves and unfavourable expectations for 
the country as a whole. 
 
Pessimists 
 
The first group, about 54% of the population, is the most clearly manifest 
and distinct one, comprising the largest relative proportion of people. 
 
In Bulgaria these are sizeable social communities: pensioners, people with 
low education and qualifications, who are out of work for longer or shorter 
periods of time. The following predominate: fears; low social activity; 
mistrust of the political institutions; downward social mobility is 
associated with and derived from Bulgaria’s contemporary history (after 
1989), and the general verdict is “wrong development”. This group’s 
pessimism results directly from its social experience over the last decade. 
This is the group of people who have not only lost from reform but have 
practically no resources to change their present situation. This is the 
losing majority of Bulgaria. They draw their incomes from jobs requiring 
low education and qualifications. They have been marginalized and 
pushed out of the modern world, with a much lower rate of access to 
computers, hence the Internet. This group is strongly influenced by 
apocalyptic media images as they mirror its own sense of helplessness; 
people in this group are most inclined to imagine that “outside pressure” is 
exerted on the country’s development, as well as to catch at rescue models. 
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Characteristics: 
Low income: 66% earn up to 100 levs a month 
Mostly women 
Low education: 86% secondary or lower; of them 43% elementary or lower 
Elderly population: 33% of pensioners 
A total of 56% do not work 
Extremely pessimistic expectations for the country and for their own life 
Extremely low citizens’ activity  
Untypical pessimists 
 
There is a subgroup of pessimists, namely the group that does not have 
the objective characteristics placing them at the bottom of social 
stratification. These are people with higher education and incomes, who, 
however, fully share the pessimistic vision. Their distinctive 
characteristics: public sector employees (64% public sector, 31% private 
sector); they have done more planning and have achieved more than the 
rest; their vision does not stem from personal failure but from the 
reproduction of general clichés. They believe more than the rest that there 
are many people who scavenge for food in litterbins and that one can find 
a good job only if one has connections. One thing we cannot check here is 
whether there is social pessimism fostered by illegitimate channels of 
social mobility these people may have used. What is special about them is 
that they are not certain they will be able to continue using them, which is 
a source of personal and social pessimism. 
 
Analysing this social group, it should be noted that it is not society alone 
that accumulates pessimism and negativism when it witnesses cases of 
illegitimate social mobility. The representatives of this type of mobility 
themselves are sources of pessimism, too, because they cannot be sure 
they can hold on to the resources for the reproduction of this mobility 
(given the frequent changes in government and the lack of strict rules for 
administrative and civil servants, such illegitimate mobility is altogether 
justified; this accounts for the fact that its main representatives are public 
sector employees). 
Optimists 
The third group comprises people who are optimistic about themselves 
and the country. 
This is the only group, which sees the general course of the country’s 
development in the last 12 years as correct, that is, as opening up a better 
chance for personal and social prosperity. In demographic terms, it mainly 
consists of younger, highly educated people with high incomes, holding 
senior positions in the public and the private sector, more proactive, but 
also showing strong mistrust of the institutions. They share the mass 
visions of poverty in the country and the need for industrialisation. At the 
same time, two thirds of people in this group expect a change for the 
better in the country’s development, as well as in their own life, in the 
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coming years. It is important for them to be able to make decisions at the 
workplace, and most of them are. They feel they are in control of their life 
that is why their fears are much smaller. Criticism and scepticism about 
the political class is as high as in the other groups. These people dissociate 
their personal success from the political institutions and processes. Even 
people in this group, which expresses the greatest social optimism, do not 
think their social status is really higher than it was in 1989 or five years 
ago. 
 
 Compared to 5 
years ago 
Compared to 
1989 
Drop 33% 48% 
Unchanged 41% 21% 
Rise 26% 31% 
 
Among the optimists, just one in three claims he or she is upwardly 
socially mobile. This makes their attitudes very fragile. This model of 
perception (and probably of behaviour) largely fits into the hypothesis 
about non-sustainable social development. The short periods of economic 
growth, fear of new unfavourable development and comparisons with 
similar positions abroad account for this group’s guarded optimism. 
People optimistic about themselves and pessimistic about the 
country 
This group (26%) consists of people who are optimistic about their own 
development, though not about the country’s. The group fits into the 
model of optimistic behaviour but maintains a pessimistic discourse, above 
all postulating the truth of the experience of “the imagined majorities”, not 
of its own experience. These people are convinced that they manage to 
cope with life and do stand a chance, but the majority of people in 
Bulgaria are badly off.  
 
In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, they differ substantially 
from the pessimists and very little from the optimists as far as their 
structure, basic values, attitudes and personal social experience go. They 
are more strongly influenced by media messages than the optimists. 
 
The three groups differ strongly in their attitude to job security under 
socialism: it is important for 5% of optimists, 16% of those optimistic about 
themselves and pessimistic about the country, and 32% of pessimists. 
 
People who are optimistic about themselves and pessimistic about the 
country share the etatist, holistic and industrial model of state socialism, 
with all socio-demographic groups setting absolutely the same priority on 
investment, plants and factories (slight differences are observed in some of 
them, but the difference goes no further than “scoring level with 
investment”; no significant statistical deviations are observed). To them, 
Association Global Bulgaria Initiative, 2003 - 2004 
 
 28
mass success is not the result of personal effort but of connections and 
patronage. 
 
Personally, they have a rather strong proactive behaviour; loan taking is 
widespread among them; a comparison between plans and results shows a 
high ratio between planners and achievers, i.e. pessimism cannot be put 
down to the failure of personal strategies. The percentage of their 
implementation in the second and the third group is the same. Their 
personal experience is approximately the same. It is the others’ experience 
that carries a different weight. 
 
Given that the importance of concrete personal achievement is nullified by 
the general feeling of dissatisfaction, this is a group characterised by 
proactive behaviour and critical potential. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The search for answers to the questions “Why doesn’t growth give rise to 
optimism?” and “For whom doesn’t growth give rise to optimism?” helps us 
distinguish among several groups of answers and determine the priority 
target groups of a future policy of expansion of the social base of the policy 
of economic growth and sustainable development, which was the main aim 
of the survey. 
 
The survey tested different hypotheses, which complement one another 
and interact with one another to answer the question why economic 
growth does not generate social optimism. The status-income hypothesis 
has the highest explanatory value. It explains the expectations, views and 
behaviour of 54% of Bulgarians, which also reflects the socio-demographic 
character of Bulgarian society. In this social group, income growth is 
measured in terms of reduction of poverty, not of opportunities opening up 
for future development. This is the group of long-term losers, whose 
pessimism objectively reflects their socio-economic prospects. 
 
The impossibility to turn upward social mobility into a positive vision for 
one’s own and the country’s development proved to be the clue to the 
puzzle of the Bulgarian transition. The survey registered a trend to 
stronger social mobility among more than 40% of respondents. Such 
positive trends, however, are hard to transform into individual optimism 
because the vast majority of respondents view their present situation as 
loss of status from 1989, and because this majority has no model of social 
progress other than that of socialist modernisation. Negative expectations 
become understandable through the prism of the other hypotheses: the 
conflict nature of democratic society, media negativism and the imagined 
majorities through which we contemplate our own world. 
 
Personal experience is not the prism through which reform beneficiaries 
think of the future of the country as a whole. That the winners consider 
themselves an exception is confirmed by their conviction that they have 
succeeded despite, not thanks to, the system. 
The dramatic discrepancy between optimism about one’s own future and 
pessimism about the country is also explained with the specific experience 
of certain social groups such as migrant workers. This sociologically 
significant social group returns from its “work trips” to Europe better off, 
though not with a sense of positive social mobility. The anthropological 
part of the survey shows that, on the whole, this group does not transfer 
either values or know-how. Unlike “the peasant with the bicycle” of the 
socialist industrialisation era, who sees his migration from a village to a 
town as upward social mobility, “the city-dweller on the bus” of the early 
21st century considers his work in Europe a loss of status – a feeling which 
is one of the reasons why even the recognition of one’s own prospects is not 
seen as giving grounds for social optimism. 
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Optimism - 
pessimism 
A household member 
has worked abroad 
No household member 
has worked abroad 
Optimistic about 
themselves and the 
country 
16% 16% 
Optimistic about 
themselves and 
pessimistic about the 
country 
33% 27% 
Pessimistic about 
themselves and the 
country 
51% 57% 
 
 
Income and social status of people in households in which someone has 
worked abroad and households in which no one has worked abroad. 
 
Income per household 
member 
A household member 
has worked abroad 
No household member 
has worked abroad 
Under 50 levs 11% 23% 
50-100 levs 36% 39% 
100-150 levs 23% 19% 
150-200 levs 20% 11% 
200-300 levs 13%   5% 
Over 300 levs   7%   3% 
Social status on a scale 
from 1 to 10 
  
Low (1-4) 58% 55% 
Medium (5) 23% 23% 
High (6-10) 22% 21% 
 
 
Challenges to reform policy 
 
The conclusions of our survey bear out the observation that economic 
growth does not automatically lead to positive expectations for the future. 
The findings, however, disprove the psychological explanations, as well as 
those based on national psychology, of the current situation. They also 
disprove the naïve psychological theory that the collapse of extremely 
unrealistic overexpectations for change in individual lifestyle is a source of 
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social pessimism. The individual world has been torn from the social 
world, though not necessarily due to a collapse of individual strategies. 
 
On the contrary, the newly emerged social mobility is a prerequisite for a 
change in the way a considerable minority of people is beginning to 
perceive the world of transition, but the results of the change in one’s 
prospects lag 3 to 5 years behind the change in an individual’s income and 
vector of development. But while the individual’s social optimism stems 
directly from the change in the environment, there is a need for political 
effort if this personal optimism is to translate into a positive expectation 
for the country‘s overall development. So far attempts to expand the social 
base of the growth policy have largely been planned and made in a way 
rather inadequate to the changed social situation. They address 
yesterday’s issues and groups. They combine features of budget populism, 
addressing the groups’ income alone, with attempts at a communication 
policy which must convince society that one government or another is 
successful.   
The survey shows, however, that a policy of budget injections and positive 
thinking mantras does not bring about a change in optimism. 
   
The challenge facing the Bulgarian transition is not how to neutralise 
losers, but how to mobilise the beneficiaries of change. There is a majority 
of upwardly socially mobile people in the active population. 
 
People optimistic about themselves and pessimistic about the country are 
the most important target group from the point of view of expanding the 
social base of sustainable growth policy. This group fits into the model of 
optimistic economic behaviour but maintains pessimistic discourse, mostly 
postulating the truth of the experience of “imagined majorities” rather 
than of its own social experience. These people do not trust their own 
experience, they do not believe their eyes. They are convinced that they 
cope with life and do stand a chance, but the majority of Bulgarians are 
badly off. This is the target group of the policy seeking to consolidate 
support for reform. The strategy regarding this group should be designed 
to give it the largest possible political representation. This group is looking 
for recognition, not help. 
 
The policy to the majority of people, who have lost from reform not just 
subjectively but objectively as well, is the second major challenge. The 
survey data show that educational policy is strategically most important 
with a view to creating a just society in Bulgaria. Within a year, education 
has doubled its influence as a factor in social stratification. The provision 
of quality education to underprivileged groups is the only significant 
criterion for the progress of Bulgarian society. 
What we are witnessing is a double failure. Economic policy has 
engendered growth, but reform beneficiaries lack political representation. 
The underprivileged strata have no access to quality education and 
Bulgaria faces the risk of the emergence of a large underclass. 
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In Albert Hirschman’s terms, the losers have no exit option and the 
winners have no voice option. 
 
 
 
